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Beyond Aristotle: Alternative Rhetorics and the Conflict Over
the U.S. Law Professor Persona(e)
CARLO A. PEDRIOLI
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior research has sketched out a picture in which, at least since 1960
and continuing to the present, advocates of the differing personae, or roles,
of the U.S. law professor have been sharply divided over such personae.1
Lawyers have advocated two major personae for the law professor to
perform. One major persona is that of the scholar, who is a full-time
teacher, researcher, and sometimes public servant, but who often has limited
practical experience.2 The other major persona is that of the practitioner,
who has a substantial number of years of practice at the bar and is prepared
for hands-on lawyering instruction.3 At stake in this communication is the
future of the central figure in the education of prospective lawyers, the one
who “convey[s] a sense of what it means to be a lawyer.”4

 Assistant Professor of Law, Barry University. B.A. (summa cum laude), Communication and
English, California State University, Stanislaus, 1999; J.D., University of the Pacific, 2002; M.A.,
Communication, University of Utah, 2003; Ph.D., Communication, University of Utah, 2005. The
author is a member of the State Bar of California. For insightful feedback on prior versions of this
Article, the author thanks David J. Vergobbi of the University of Utah, Lisa Flores of the University of
Colorado at Boulder, Wayne McCormack of the University of Utah, Tarla Rai Peterson of Texas A&M
University, and Richard D. Rieke of the University of Utah.
1. See generally Carlo A. Pedrioli, Professor Kingsfield in Conflict: Rhetorical Constructions of the
U.S. Law Professor Persona(e), 38 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 701 (2012).
2. Id. at 711.
3. Id. at 720.
4. Jason Ostrom, The Competing Roles of Law Professors, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 539, 540 (2001).
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The lawyers who have constructed these personae generally have
employed traditional Aristotelian rhetoric, or persuasion, a process that has
contributed to much rhetorical clash and little rhetorical understanding.5
Unfortunately, this conflict has continued to the present time without much
improvement in the communication. Indeed, although the lawyers have
advanced their own positions, these lawyers generally have not listened to
each other carefully to understand the relevant positions in the discourse,6
and when the lawyers have listened at all, they have done so to point out
why different perspectives are “wrong.” A prediction for the future of such
discourse was only “marginal change” at best.7 Because to a large extent
this is a communication problem, the situation calls for a communication
approach.
Sonja K. Foss and Cindy L. Griffin’s invitational rhetoric,8 an
alternative to the millennia-old traditional Western concept of rhetoric as
persuasion, is one such approach that should be of value to the lawyers
embroiled in the ongoing conflict.9 This alternative approach to rhetoric
offers the audience of the rhetoric a chance “to enter the rhetor’s world and
to see it as the rhetor does” without the necessity of a win-lose decision,
such as the one in a political election or a legal trial.10 Rather than seeking
to change other participants, the rhetor, or communicator, seeks to help the
other participants in the communication understand the rhetor’s

5. Pedrioli, supra note 1, at 704.
6. Douglas D. McFarland, Students and Practicing Lawyers Identify The Ideal Law Professor, 36 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 93, 106 (1986).
7. Id. at 106-07.
8. Sonja K. Foss & Cindy L. Griffin, Beyond Persuasion: A Proposal for an Invitational Rhetoric,
62 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 2, 5 (1995).
9. Foss and Griffin’s study has received scholarly attention and become important for a variety of
reasons. For example, M. Lane Bruner argued that Foss and Griffin’s study of invitational rhetoric has
“played an important role in revealing how women have been excluded from much of traditional rhetorical scholarship.” M. Lane Bruner, Produci ng Identities: Gender Problematization and Feminist Argumentation, 32 ARGUMENTATION & ADVOC. 185, 188 (1996). Bruner added that the study has “contributed substantially to an understanding of the constraining and enabling features of identification practices.” Id. Irwin Mallin and Karrin Vasby Anderson observed that the study has revived discussion about
how modes of rhetoric can be “most productive” to the parties involved. Irwin Mallin & Karrin Vasby
Anderson, Inviting Constructive Argument, 36 ARGUMENTATION & ADVOC. 120, 121 (2000). As Mallin
and Anderson noted, invitational rhetoric is important “because it offers a new frame of reference for
what argument can and should accomplish [and] assigns [communicators] new responsibilities” outside
those responsibilities of traditional rhetoric. Id. at 124. Because of scholarly responses like these, additional consideration of invitational rhetoric is appropriate for a more thorough understanding of how
invitational rhetoric might be of service to human communicators. Jeffrey Thomas Bile, Communication, Advocacy, Argumentation, and Feminisms: Toward a Dialectical Partnership, 32 SPEAKER &
GAVEL 55, 63 (1995). Such communicators include lawyers who have had a difficult time communicating successfully with each other.
10. Foss & Griffin, supra note 8, at 5.
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perspective.11 Then the other participants become empowered because they
have an opportunity to express themselves while the original rhetor listens.
Although invitational rhetoric should be helpful, invitational rhetoric is
one important step in the ultimate suggested approach of this Article, not the
ultimate approach itself. In a legal field that assumes traditional rhetoric,
invitational rhetoric alone would be inadequate. Invitational rhetoric focuses
on the dialogue that has been missing from the communication regarding
the construction of the law professor persona(e), but, because the legal field
works principally with traditional rhetoric, traditional rhetoric also calls for
some consideration. Cooperative rhetoric12 embraces both the dialogue of
invitational rhetoric and the argumentation of traditional rhetoric.12
Invitational rhetoric will help develop the theoretically underdeveloped
dialogic dimension of cooperative rhetoric, the dimension of cooperative
rhetoric more needed in the ongoing conflict over the law professor
persona(e), and cooperative rhetoric, in considering argumentation as well
as dialogue, ultimately will be a better fit with the legal field than
invitational rhetoric. Invitational and cooperative rhetorics can benefit from
each other. Hence, the attention paid to invitational rhetoric will be
important because this attention will develop a stronger understanding of
cooperative rhetoric.
Accordingly, this Article maintains that alternative rhetorics offer new
possibilities to help improve the conflict over the persona(e) of the U.S. law
professor. To expand upon this perspective, the Article will begin with a
discussion of invitational rhetoric, both defining invitational rhetoric and
illustrating how invitational rhetoric can be helpful for lawyers presently
involved in the conflict over the rhetorical construction of the law professor
persona(e).13 The Article then will continue with a discussion of cooperative
rhetoric, defining cooperative rhetoric as invitational rhetoric informs it,
outlining the form of alternative dispute resolution known as collaborative
law as a precedent for the implementation of cooperative rhetoric in the
legal field, and illustrating how cooperative rhetoric can work in the conflict
over the ideal law professor persona(e).

11. Id.
12. Scholars label this concept differently. See infra Section III.A. For consistency, this Article will
employ the term cooperative rhetoric.
13. In presenting an argument for invitational rhetoric as one tool for improving the status of the
13. In
presenting
an argument
invitational
as one
tool forthe
improving
the status
of the
conflict
between
two major
groups for
of lawyers,
this rhetoric
Article will
exemplify
tension between
taking
a
conflict
two major
groups
lawyers, this Article
will exemplify
the tension
taking
positionbetween
on invitational
rhetoric
andofcommunicating
in an invitational
manner.
Such between
can be the
para-a
position
rhetoric
andof
communicating
in an invitational manner. Such can be the paradoxdoxical, on
andinvitational
thus intriguing,
nature
rhetoric.
ical, and thus intriguing, nature of rhetoric.
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II. INVITATIONAL RHETORIC
A. Defining Invitational Rhetoric14
Invitational rhetoric is very different from traditional Aristotelian
rhetoric, and an understanding of the latter helps inform an understanding of
the former. Traditional rhetoric involves attempting to persuade an
audience to accept an advocate’s position. In his fourth century B.C.
treatise On Rhetoric, Aristotle defined the term rhetoric as “an ability, in
each [particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion.”15 Hence,
in a given situation a skilled advocate endeavors to find multiple modes of
persuasion rather than just one.16 Much more recently, but still in the
Aristotelian vein, Michael Leff described the term rhetoric as an endeavor
whose goal is persuasion.17 As the reference to Aristotle suggests, the study
of traditional rhetoric dates back to the ancient world, specifically to fifth
century B.C. Athens, and ever since male Greek citizens of that era called
upon rhetoric in the process of bringing and defending legal suits, debating
matters of public policy, and speaking on special occasions, rhetoric has
been important.18
Such traditional rhetoric involves justifying why a particular position is
appropriate. Today, traditional rhetoric manifests itself in political debates,
legal trials and appeals, and advertising.19 Some traditional rhetorics are
more fully supported with evidence than others. In many rhetorical
situations,20 advocates seek to change audiences to serve the advocates’ own
ends. One can think of politicians who want to gain or retain office,
lawyers who want to win large contingency fees, and advertisers who seek
to sell a seemingly endless stream of consumer products. Not only do such
examples of traditional rhetoric often involve justifying why a particular
14. A previous version of this discussion of invitational rhetoric appeared in Carlo A. Pedrioli, A
New Image in the Looking Glass: Faculty Mentoring, Invitational Rhetoric, and the Second-Class
Status of Women in U.S. Academia, 15 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 185 (2004). The author of that article
has retained revision and republication rights to the article.
15. ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 36 (George A. Kennedy trans.,
1991).
16. JAMES L. GOLDEN, GOODWIN F. BERQUIST, & WILLIAM E. COLEMAN, THE RHETORIC OF
WESTERN THOUGHT 28 (6th ed. 1997).
17. Michael Leff, The Habitation of Rhetoric, in ARGUMENT AND CRITICAL PRACTICES:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH SCA/AFA CONFERENCE ON ARGUMENTATION 1, 6 (Joseph W. Wenzel ed.,
1987).
18. GOLDEN, BERQUIST, & COLEMAN, supra note 16, at 6, 8.
19. Id. at viii; CHARLES U. LARSON, PERSUASION: RECEPTION AND RESPONSIBILITY 5, 8 (7th ed.
1995).
20. For more on the rhetorical situation, see Lloyd F. Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, 1 PHIL. &
RHETORIC 1 (1968). For a critique of Bitzer’s argument, see Richard E. Vatz, The Myth of the Rhetorical Situation, 6 PHIL. & RHETORIC 154 (1973).
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position is “right,”21 but frequently, by necessity, such examples involve
explaining why another position is “wrong.”
In contrast to traditional rhetoric, “[i]nvitational rhetoric is an invitation
to understanding as a means to create a relationship rooted in equality,
immanent value, and self-determination.”22 Invitational rhetoric offers the
audience a chance “to enter the rhetor’s world and to see it as the rhetor
does.”23 When speaking, the rhetor, or communicator, refrains from judging
the perspectives of other participants in the communication process, and the
other participants attempt to refrain from judging the perspectives of the
rhetor.24 Instead of seeking to change other participants, the rhetor tries to
help the other participants understand the rhetor’s perspective.25 Then the
other participants become empowered because they have a chance to
express themselves while the original rhetor listens.
The process, which is akin to bilateral dialogue,26 is about offering
perspectives and not about telling others to take a given action or
understand that their ideas are flawed.27 Because this is a process of
rhetoric as inquiry,28 any change in perspective that takes place occurs when
members of the audience choose to make such change, but do so without the
influence of a rhetor who presses for that change.29 No “winner” prevails,
and no “loser” feels the sting of defeat. Importantly, invitational rhetoric is
about a constructive communication process, not a specific content or a
substantive result. Since a prescribed content would violate the invitational
spirit of invitational rhetoric, the exact content of the rhetoric is up to the
invitational rhetors.
Although invitational rhetoric will not succeed in all cases in which
advocates employ it, when invitational rhetoric succeeds, it tends to consist
of at least three external conditions: safety, value, and freedom. 30 Foss and
Griffin have defined these conditions in the following manner: safety as
“the creation of a feeling of security and [absence of] danger for the
21. JOSINA M. MAKAU & DEBIAN L. MARTY, COOPERATIVE ARGUMENTATION: A MODEL FOR
DELIBERATIVE COMMUNITY 84 (2001).
22. Foss & Griffin, supra note 8, at 5.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Bile, supra note 9, at 62.
27. Foss & Griffin, supra note 8, at 7, 10; Mallin & Anderson, supra note 9, at 130.
28. Irene P. Faass, Shades of Gray: Alternative Metaphors for Argumentation, in ARGUING
COMMUNICATION & CULTURE: SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE TWELFTH NCA/AFA CONFERENCE ON
ARGUMENTATION 219, 220 (G. Thomas Goodnight ed., 2002).
29. SONJA K. FOSS & KAREN A. FOSS, INVITING TRANSFORMATION: PRESENTATIONAL SPEAKING
FOR A CHANGING WORLD 13-14 (2003).
30. Foss & Griffin, supra note 8, at 10.
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audience,” value as “the acknowledgment that audience members have
intrinsic or immanent worth,” and freedom as “the power to choose or
decide.”31 To the work of Foss and Griffin, Foss and colleague Karen A.
Foss have added openness as a fourth condition that helps foster invitational
rhetoric.32 Foss and Foss have defined openness as the process of
“seek[ing] out and consider[ing] as many perspectives as possible.”33
To help foster the conditions of safety, value, freedom, and openness
that can lead to invitational rhetoric, Foss and Foss have suggested the
process of re-sourcement, which refers to finding a new source of “energy
and inspiration.”34 Re-sourcement involves disengaging oneself from an
interaction frame of conquest or conversion of one’s audience and then
engaging that audience from a nonconquest and nonconversion interaction
frame.35
At this point in the discussion of invitational rhetoric, another
consideration becomes appropriate. Although this Article has presented
invitational rhetoric in contrast to traditional rhetoric because of a number
of differences between the two types of rhetoric, the Article in no way
means to imply that invitational rhetoric and traditional rhetoric are binary
opposites. Rather, it may be more helpful to think of any given discourse as
situated on a continuum that ranges from invitational rhetoric to traditional
rhetoric. For instance, discourse may be closer to traditional rhetoric, or
discourse may be closer to invitational rhetoric.
In attempting to show how invitational rhetoric can work, Foss and
Griffin have offered several examples of successful invitational rhetoric in
differing communication situations such as interpersonal communication
and public address situations. One such example involved two individuals
with drastically opposing perspectives on abortion.36 Encountering each
other at an airport in New York, a woman, who favored abortion, and a
man, who opposed abortion, began to scream at each other until they almost
needed separation.37 One hour later, as the woman boarded a bus, she
discovered that the only available seat was next to the man with whom she
had just had the verbal altercation.38 Instead of resuming the same type of
discourse, the woman began to ask the man about his life, and the man

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 10-12.
FOSS & FOSS, supra note 29, at 39.
Id.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 44-48.
Foss & Griffin, supra note 8, at 14-15.
Id. at 14.
Id.
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responded in kind.39 While neither changed perspective, over the course of
the dialogue each developed a deeper understanding of and appreciation for
the other.40 In a case where traditional rhetoric had proved destructive,
invitational rhetoric had succeeded in fostering the external conditions of
safety, value, freedom,41 and openness. Each speaker promoted safety by
respecting a differing perspective on a highly charged issue, each speaker
promoted value by legitimizing a different point of view, and each speaker
promoted freedom by allowing the other speaker to continue to feel as she
or he chose to feel with regard to this subject. Also, each speaker promoted
openness by looking at a different perspective.
Another example of successful invitational rhetoric that Foss and
Griffin have offered involved the manner in which poets Adrienne Rich,
Alice Walker, and Audre Lorde handled acceptance of the 1974 National
Book Award.42 Although all three women had received nominations for the
award, only Rich received the actual award.43 However, when Rich
accepted the award, she did so on behalf of herself, Walker, and Lorde,
noting, “‘We, Audre Lorde, Adrienne Rich, and Alice Walker, together
accept this award in the name of all the women whose voices have gone and
still go unheard in a patriarchal world.’”44 In expressing their own
perspective in this manner, the poets fostered the external conditions of
safety, value, freedom,45 and openness. The poets promoted safety by
recognizing as legitimate the one-winner approach of the judges of the
National Book Awards, the poets promoted the value of the members of the
extended audience by noting the personal sacrifices of many audience
members, and the poets promoted freedom by allowing the audience to
choose its own course of action in response to the speech.46 Also, the poets
promoted openness by placing their perspective in a communication context
of differing perspectives on the matter at hand.
As these two examples suggest, invitational rhetoric can be beneficial
for several reasons. For instance, invitational rhetoric is particularly wellsuited for fostering “cooperative, nonadversarial, and ethical
communication” because invitational rhetoric accepts multiple perspectives
as valid.47 Invitational rhetoric is especially helpful when one is engaged in
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id. at 14-15.
Foss & Griffin, supra note 8, at 15.
Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id.
Foss & Griffin, supra note 8, at 13-14.
Id. at 15-16.
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discourse with another person with whom one has an ongoing relationship,48
although invitational rhetoric is not limited to this type of situation. In
contrast, when one goes to court and hopes never to see one’s opponent
after the trial, then traditional rhetoric may be more appropriate.49
Nonetheless, the bus example above indicates that invitational rhetoric can
be helpful with strangers, too.50
Additionally, invitational rhetoric validates the personal experiences of
different individuals.51 Invitational rhetors do not have to be physicians,
scientists, or attorneys to have valuable experiences to share with other
invitational rhetors. Common experience, whether from the lives of women
or men or from the lives of privileged or less-privileged individuals, can
have merit in invitational rhetoric. Invitational rhetors can call upon such
experiences to present their own personal truths about life.52
Moreover, invitational rhetoric gives women and other outsiders, as
well as individuals empathetic to the situations of such outsiders, a resource
to employ in attempting “to transform systems of domination and
oppression.”53 Foss and Foss have suggested that invitational rhetoric can
help a rhetor to understand the positions of individuals, such as neo-Nazis,
whose perspectives are hateful to many people.54 With a better
understanding of such perspectives, the rhetor then can go about attempting
to change the conditions that foster hateful perspectives.55 Accordingly,
invitational rhetoric offers several important benefits to rhetors.
B. Applying Invitational Rhetoric to the Conflict over the Construction
of the Law Professor Persona(e)
Although invitational rhetoric might play out successfully in a number
of conflicts common in the legal field, this Article focuses on the conflict
regarding the rhetorical construction of the law professor persona(e). To
sketch out how invitational rhetoric could unfold among lawyers involved
in that conflict, this subsection of the Article will consider incentives for,
contexts for, a process of, and possible content change of participation in
invitational rhetoric. The subsection also will address benefits of and
potential concerns with using invitational rhetoric.
48. Mallin & Anderson, supra note 9, at 130-31.
49. Id. at 130.
50. Foss & Griffin, supra note 8, at 14-15.
51. Id. at 5-6, 16.
52. Karen A. Foss & Sonja K. Foss, Personal Experience as Evidence in Feminist Scholarship, 58
W. J. COMM. 39, 39-40 (1994).
53. Foss & Griffin, supra note 8, at 16.
54. FOSS & FOSS, supra note 29, at 18.
55. Id. at 18-19.
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First, for lawyers from the academy and lawyers from the world of
practice to participate in invitational rhetoric and foster a better
understanding of differing views on the persona(e) of the law professor, the
lawyers would need some incentive. This incentive exists in the major
goals of legal education. R. Randall Kelso and Charles D. Kelso offered
four major goals of legal education that help explain how academic lawyers
and practicing lawyers can find the incentive to communicate more
effectively about legal education in general and the law professor persona(e)
more specifically.56 According to Kelso and Kelso, four major goals of
legal education are the following: (1) advancing scholarship on the law, (2)
graduating students who are able to perform the roles that practicing
lawyers perform, (3) developing in law students the skills of legal problemsolving, and (4) motivating law students to enter the ongoing discussion
among members of the legal community about what the law is now and
should become in the future.57
These goals generally have appeal for both academics and practitioners.
Although academic lawyers may be more interested in scholarship and
practicing lawyers may be more interested in the roles that practicing
lawyers perform, these particular goals are important to both groups. For
instance, academic lawyers like James Barr Ames have admitted that their
scholarship should inform the practice of law,58 a prospect that has
immediate significance for practicing lawyers who could benefit from preexisting thinking on important topics. After all, practitioners cannot be
experts in all areas of the law.59 From this perspective, scholarship needs to
do something outside the academy. If scholarship does not, the credibility
of academics comes into question. An important relationship exists, then,
between scholarship and the roles that lawyers perform in practice.
Furthermore, the skills of legal problem-solving apply to both law
school discussions and the everyday world of legal practice. At one level or
another, both academics and practitioners deal with legal problems, and
both groups would want future lawyers to know how to approach these legal
problems. Again, this point gets at the relevance of legal education, but the
point also gets at a basic set of professional skills upon which practitioners
rely. Thus, legal problem-solving skills are of interest to lawyers of an
academic nature as well as lawyers of a more practical nature.

56. R. RANDALL KELSO & CHARLES D. KELSO, STUDYING LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 12-15 (1984).
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., James Barr Ames, The Vocation of the Law Professor, 48 AM. L. REG. 129, 142-43
(1900).
59. Id. at 143.
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Additionally, discussion on what the law is and what it should become
is another area of overlap. Thoughtful and learned discussions on the
role(s) of the law are well-suited to the writing of law review articles, an
activity that would appeal to academic lawyers, but these discussions also
can have a meaningful impact on the lives of practicing lawyers because
those lawyers have to interact with the processes of the law on a daily
basis.60 Hence, a working understanding of the present and future states of
the law should have appeal to both lawyers inside and outside the academy.
Given the general appeal of the noted goals of legal education to both
academic lawyers and practicing lawyers, some room for common ground
exists. Discussion of this common ground, which essentially gets at the
purposes of legal education, provides the incentive for lawyers from the two
groups to employ invitational rhetoric regarding legal education. As
focused more particularly on the subject matter of the conflict regarding the
law professor persona(e), this common ground would urge consideration of
the appropriate persona(e) of the law professor in furthering the major goals
of legal education. With regard to the overlapping goals considered above,
the law professor has, by way of his or her professional status, an important
influence on legal scholarship, the skills of legal problem-solving, and the
discussion of the role(s) of the law in society. As noted above, legal
scholarship can inform the roles that practicing lawyers perform.61
Accordingly, academic lawyers and practicing lawyers do have an incentive
to try to communicate more productively about the role(s) of the law
professor in legal education.
Second, lawyers in favor of the scholar persona of the law professor and
lawyers in favor of the practitioner persona of the law professor who find
such an incentive to communicate invitationally would need to be able to
communicate with each other in a context conducive to invitational rhetoric.
Such a context would have physical and discursive dimensions. In terms of
the physical dimension, lawyers often meet during law school campus
lectures, bar association functions, and the day-to-day work of public
service functions of the bar.62 While law journals could be a forum for
addressing the conflict that historically has played out in law journals,
encouraging lawyers initially to communicate in person probably would be
more effective since casually dismissing the views of someone who is
physically present in the same context can be difficult.
60. Robert A. Leflar, The Law Teacher’s Place in the American Legal Profession, 8 J. SOC’Y PUB.
TCHRS. L. 21, 27-28 (1964).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 22, 24.
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In terms of the discursive dimension of the context, lawyers would need
to foster the external conditions of safety, value, freedom, and openness.63
To foster safety, or “the creation of a feeling of security and [absence of]
danger for the audience,”64 lawyers would need to feel free from the
courtroom clash that often comes with traditional legal advocacy. When
one is in court to try or appeal a case, one functions in a situation in which
one’s views on a given matter constantly come under critique. As such,
communicating invitationally right after the close of a heated trial or appeal
would not be the best approach for fostering safety.
To foster value, or “the acknowledgment that audience members have
intrinsic or immanent worth,”65 lawyers again would need to avoid the clash
of the courtroom or other often hostile environments like a negotiation
situation between two divorcing spouses. In environments largely free of
this type of clash, such as bar association meetings, award functions, and
other civically oriented functions, lawyers more likely would be more open
to respect each other as people. In this type of situation, value of other
lawyers would be possible.
Moreover, lawyers would want to foster freedom, or “the power to
choose or decide.”66 For many lawyers, achieving this external condition
should not be too difficult, at least in one sense. Many lawyers would not
have a difficult time making up their own minds on issues. However,
lawyers also would need to learn to respect the rights of others to make up
their own minds. Some trial lawyers might have a tendency to expect
audiences to accept advocates’ advocacy. Of course, audiences have their
own minds. Just as a jury can decide as it wishes, so can other lawyers.
Recognizing this point might be a challenge for some lawyers, but sufficient
quality communications with other parties as fellow humans, not as
opponents, would help in this matter.
In addition to fostering safety, value, and freedom through their
discourse, lawyers would want to foster the external condition of openness,
or the procedure of “seek[ing] out and consider[ing] as many perspectives
as possible.”67 Given that the legal field is one of advocacy, this external
condition may be a challenge for lawyers to achieve. Again, a trial or
appellate lawyer received training in finding the “correct” answer to a legal
problem and vigorously advocating that perspective on behalf of a client.
Nonetheless, lawyers committed to treating each other respectfully could be
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Foss & Griffin, supra note 8, at 10; FOSS & FOSS, supra note 29, at 39.
Foss & Griffin, supra note 8, at 10-11.
Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 12.
FOSS & FOSS, supra note 29, at 39.
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willing to listen to each other to understand each other effectively.
Acquiring multiple understandings of the ideal law professor persona(e)
would be a function of having communicated with various other lawyers in
an invitational manner. Thus, while facing a challenge, lawyers willing to
listen carefully could achieve openness. In a situation in which lawyers
could accomplish the external conditions of safety, value, freedom, and
openness, the lawyers would stand a good chance of communicating in an
invitational manner.
Third, the process of invitational rhetoric would be an attempt to
understand the views of individuals with different perspectives on the law
professor persona(e). Change of views would be a possibility that may
come from the process, but, in the absence of change, participating lawyers
still would have the opportunity to develop positive ongoing professional
relationships that they may not have enjoyed to date. At a minimum,
willing lawyers would be able to understand more effectively the parties
whom they have come to ignore or dismiss with uninformed argument.
While the process of invitational rhetoric is not as precise as a multistep plan for terminating one’s smoking habit or another vice, the following
is a suggestion of how the process might unfold between two individuals
with different views of the role(s) of the law professor. A communication
consultant would lay out this general process for the participating lawyers.
As the consultant would explain, the process most likely would begin in an
informal manner at a gathering where academic lawyers and practicing
lawyers would be present, such as one of the gatherings mentioned above.
After the usual pleasantries, the two lawyers, located in a comfortable
setting, would take turns explaining their views on the topic, and each
lawyer would have the opportunity to enter the other lawyer’s world and see
it as the other lawyer would see it.68 When speaking, one lawyer would
refrain from judging the perspective of the other lawyer in the discussion,
and the other lawyer would attempt to refrain from judging the perspective
of the lawyer who was speaking.69 Instead of change, the focus of the
communication would be understanding.70
The communication consultant would explain that the first lawyer,
taking the initiative, could outline the particulars of how she saw the role of
the law professor in legal education. Meanwhile, the second lawyer would
make the effort to place his own views of the role of the law professor aside
and also make an effort to understand the views of the first lawyer, which
68. Foss & Griffin, supra note 8, at 5.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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might include the need for the law professor to be a scholar. The second
lawyer would have to listen carefully and may even want to take some brief
notes. If this were done politely, the second lawyer, almost becoming an
active student of the views of the first lawyer, could ask the first lawyer to
pause in her discussion and address a few points of clarification. Mallin and
Anderson have termed this type of active listening reflective listening.71
The idea is that throughout the process the second lawyer would gain a
developing understanding of the first lawyer’s explanations. While some
points of clarification could be helpful, the second lawyer, upon receiving
clarifications, then would need to make sure the first lawyer was able to
complete her explanation. Most likely, this step in the process would take
more than just a few minutes, especially since the second lawyer would
want to allow the first lawyer to explain why she viewed the role of the law
professor as she did. At the end of this process, the second lawyer should
be able to explain accurately and in some detail the first lawyer’s views to
the first lawyer.
The communication consultant would note that, after the first lawyer
had a chance to explain her view of the law professor and the second lawyer
had inquired about any points of clarification, the second lawyer then would
have an opportunity to outline the particulars of how he saw the role of the
law professor. Meanwhile, the first lawyer would try to place her personal
views of the role of the law professor aside and focus on understanding the
views of the second lawyer, which might include a need for the law
professor to be a practitioner. The first lawyer would have to listen
carefully and might desire to take some notes. As before, except with roles
reversed, the first lawyer, essentially becoming an active student of the
views of the second lawyer, could ask the second lawyer to pause in his
explanation and address a few matters of clarification. The idea is that
throughout the process the first lawyer would gain a developing
understanding of the second lawyer’s explanations. Although a few points
of clarification could be helpful, the first lawyer, upon receiving
clarifications, would need to make sure the second lawyer would be able to
complete his explanation. This step in the process probably would take
time, especially since the first lawyer would want to allow the second
lawyer to explain why he viewed the role of the law professor as he did. At
the end of this process, the first lawyer should be able to explain accurately
and in some detail the second lawyer’s views to the second lawyer. As the
consultant would explain to the participating lawyers, during both stages of
the process of invitational rhetoric, gaining more than a superficial
71. Mallin & Anderson, supra note 9, at 129.
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understanding would be important because a deeper understanding can get
at interests rather than just at general viewpoints. Interests are concerns that
motivate people, and understanding another party’s interests can help one
connect more effectively with that party.72 Asking why a party sees
something in a particular manner can be one productive way of
understanding that party’s interests.73
Looking for underlying interests would be helpful for the two
hypothetical lawyers. For example, the second lawyer might ask the first
lawyer why the latter feels that the law professor should be a scholar, and
the first lawyer might point out that the academy requires that law schools
produce scholarship. Also, the first lawyer might ask the second lawyer
why the latter feels that the law professor should be a practitioner, and the
second lawyer could indicate that future lawyers need to learn from lawyers
who have performed the tasks that the future lawyers will perform. In this
case, two underlying interests are a requirement of functioning within the
present academic system and a need for future lawyers to learn to practice
law. Although a deeper understanding might not result in the changing of
minds,74 because of the knowledge of underlying interests and thus
explanations associated with such knowledge, this type of understanding
could allow parties to come to respect each other as professionals. In other
words, each party would know that the other party’s views were not random
and devoid of explanation. This result could be an improvement in the
communication between academic lawyers and practicing lawyers.
This hypothetical example of invitational rhetoric is just one possibility
via which the process might unfold. For instance, the consultant would note
that a similar process also could take place in small groups, in which one
lawyer would explain his or her views and also address points of
clarification. In this scenario, another lawyer then would assume that role.
The process would repeat itself until all lawyers in the group had time to
express their views. In this manner, each participant would have a chance
to speak and carefully listen for understanding. This would not always be
an easy task, but if lawyers, knowing that they all would have a chance to
talk at some point, were willing to listen to each other, the door to
understanding could begin to open.
Fourth, possible content is another part of invitational rhetoric that
should receive some attention. As with any type of rhetoric, invitational

72. ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY, & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN 40-43 (2d ed. 1991).
73. Id. at 44.
74. FOSS & FOSS, supra note 29, at 13-14.
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rhetoric does not always result in change of content,75 but, if conducted in a
willing and respectful manner, the process can help relationships,
professional and otherwise, develop.76 While the development of such
relationships is often beneficial, in some cases invitational rhetoric can lead
to some sort of change of content.77
Such potential change may take place if lawyers, upon gaining a deeper
understanding of other lawyers’ interests, come to see value in some of
those interests in relation to their own interests. For example, an academic
lawyer might decide that more interaction with the world of practice could
make his or her scholarship more accurate and relevant. Also, a practicing
lawyer might decide that some legal scholarship could inform the world of
legal practice. If enough lawyers in one group begin to see value in the
interests of lawyers in the other group and vice versa, openness to some
change or modification would become a possibility.
A prescription of the content of invitational rhetoric among lawyers
would be inconsistent with the assumptions of invitational rhetoric, which is
not a top-down communication approach in which a consultant tells
participants at what substantive result they should arrive. Foss and Griffin
have described invitational rhetoric, in part, as “an invitation to
understanding,”78 not a requirement for adopting a message. However,
several examples, while not exhaustive, can illustrate the possibilities of
invitational rhetoric as a means of fostering constructive communication
among lawyers regarding the role(s) of the law professor.
For instance, lawyers might decide to devise a law professor persona
based on a hybrid persona. One such approach might be akin to that of
Albert M. Kales, who argued for a restricted amount of practical experience
for the law professor.79 Assuming a distinction between taking care of
clients and taking care of cases, such a persona would view client care as
more business than law and something that would take a large amount of a
lawyer’s time.80 This possible model could suggest that a law professor
should handle cases, not clients, and to such cases the law professor would
bring expertise in a given area.81 By being able to test legal hypotheses, as
some might call them, through litigation, the law professor would have a
better understanding of the legal world, and such an understanding of the
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Foss & Griffin, supra note 8, at 5.
FOSS & FOSS, supra note 29, at 13-14.
Foss & Griffin, supra note 8, at 5.
Albert M. Kales, Should the Law Teacher Practice Law?, 25 HARV. L. REV. 253, 255 (1912).
Id. at 254.
Id. at 255.
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legal world would allow the law professor to become a better teacher.82
Accordingly, this persona would balance scholarly and practical interests.
Another possible hybrid approach might be akin to that of Harlan F.
Stone, who insisted that the law professor embrace a persona of both scholar
and practitioner.83 This model would note that, because logical and
practical considerations are part of practicing law, the law professor should
be familiar with both types of considerations.84 This persona could embrace
Stone’s belief that “[t]he law teacher has indeed missed his calling who has
nothing to offer his students but the solution of the purely intellectual
problems of the law.”85 In short, this law professor persona could be that of
“a well-rounded lawyer,”86 or one who has practiced law and now desires to
teach law within a university setting.
Besides the hybrid possibilities in which the law professor resides in an
academic setting and either continues a limited practice of law or has
practiced law extensively in the past, another possibility may emerge from
invitational rhetoric regarding the law professor persona(e). For instance,
law schools could accept multiple personae simultaneously. The scholar
model may become one track to tenure in the law school, while the
practitioner model discussed might become another track to tenure. The
former model would meet the university’s requirement that the law school
produce scholarship for the university, and the latter model would meet the
bar’s need for developing graduates prepared for the world of legal practice.
For this model to work on an equitable basis, the lawyers who would
develop such an approach may note that, in contrast to many cases in the
present system of legal education, both professor models would have equal
status within the law school.87 Neither scholarship nor skills training would
assume higher status, as each would serve an important purpose.
Invitational rhetoric offers several benefits to lawyers who have
communicated about the ideal law professor persona(e). These benefits
relate to this long-standing conflict but also go beyond the conflict. As
82. Id. at 259-60.
83. Harlan F. Stone, The Importance of Actual Experience at the Bar as a Preparation for Teaching
Law, 3 AM. L. SCH. REV. 205, 207 (1912).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 208.
86. Id. at 210.
87. In legal education, clinical professors often have inferior status to doctrinal professors. Anthony
V. Alfieri, Against Practice, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1073, 1074 (2009) (describing clinical education as on
“the periphery of legal education” and clinical faculty members as having “a subordinate caste status
differentiated by inferior compensation, limited governance, and segregated space”); Peter A. Joy &
Robert R. Kuehn, The Evolution of ABA Standards for Clinical Faculty, 75 TENN. L. REV. 183, 230
(2008) (noting longstanding controversy over ABA attempts to promote treatment of clinical faculty
similar to treatment of doctrinal faculty).
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suggested above, successful invitational rhetoric would allow lawyers to
come to understand each other more thoroughly on legal education topics
like the ideal law professor persona(e). With deeper understanding, which
has been an important ingredient missing from the communication, at some
point in the future lawyers could make more fully-informed decisions about
how they want their field, including its educational component, to function.
Along with greater understanding come greater possibilities for new
approaches to old challenges.
Not only would invitational rhetoric allow lawyers to come to greater
understandings of their colleagues’ views on legal education, especially
with regard to the ideal law professor persona(e), but invitational rhetoric
also would offer lawyers the chance to nourish new relationships.88 As Foss
and Griffin have emphasized, invitational rhetoric can be “a means to create
a relationship.”89 Thus, if lawyers enter other lawyers’ worlds deeply
enough, the lawyers may find something of value in those communicative
interactions and seek to continue the communication. Although ongoing
relationships would not develop in every instance, in some instances
lawyers might choose to further their communication through ongoing
relationships. When lawyers live and work in the same community,
whether they work on a university campus or in court downtown, ongoing
relationships can be of great value, particularly when lawyers need to work
on larger projects like law reform issues or pro bono efforts. Also, lawyers
of differing stripes have the future of legal education at stake because
academic lawyers work in that environment and the environment is
supposed to prepare future lawyers for the world of legal practice. Ideally,
lawyers in a particular relationship would not only gain an understanding of
other perspectives on the persona(e) at the front of the classroom in legal
education, but the lawyers would deepen their interactions on other legal, or
even nonlegal, subjects of importance. The implications of invitational
rhetoric could be widespread.
Furthermore, because invitational rhetoric accepts multiple perspectives
as valid, it is particularly well-suited for fostering “cooperative,
nonadversarial, and ethical communication.”90 In the legal field, which
often, although not always, gives pride of place to the more combative
manifestations of traditional rhetoric, lawyers could improve by interacting
with each other in a different manner on some occasions. Indeed, lawyers
88. Jennifer Emerling Bone, Cindy L. Griffin, & T. M. Linda Scholz, Beyond Traditional Conceptualizations of Rhetoric: Invitational Rhetoric and a Move Toward Civility, 72 W. J. COMM. 434, 446
(2008).
89. Foss & Griffin, supra note 8, at 5.
90. Id. at 15.
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have to work with court and office personnel, each other, and sometimes
other professionals like expert witnesses. While successful lawyers have to
function within an adversarial system, learning to communicate in other
ways when possible would add an important humane dimension to legal
practice, particularly when listening to the perspectives of others can be
helpful to one’s work. This point is especially salient when one is
communicating with another person with whom one has an ongoing
relationship, such as a court clerk or opposing counsel.91
On a related note, since invitational rhetoric is a process of rhetoric as
inquiry,92 any change in perspective that takes place occurs when members
of the audience choose to make such change, but do so without the
influence of a rhetor who presses for that change.93 For many lawyers, this
type of communication will not be intuitive. Given the entrenched nature of
the processes of the U.S. legal system, traditional rhetoric has its place.
However, not all types of communication require that communicators try to
change each other. Indeed, a break from the world of persuasion, a world
that still calls for “right” and “wrong” answers to often complex problems,
would be pleasant for many overworked attorneys. Avoiding the pressure
of many types of persuasion would be a healthy change. Instead, when
communicating within an invitational paradigm, lawyers would have the
chance to make up their minds on matters like the ideal law professor
persona(e) free of pressure.
Accordingly, invitational rhetoric offers lawyers several important
benefits. This genre of rhetoric offers opportunities for greater
understanding of perspectives on legal education, including perspectives
regarding the ideal law professor role(s). Moreover, invitational rhetoric
also offers chances for relationship building and more humane, relaxed
discourse.
Although invitational rhetoric offers several benefits to legal
practitioners that would include and go beyond gaining a greater
understanding of the various perspectives on the ideal law professor
persona(e), one might raise a few concerns regarding the implementation of
invitational rhetoric in the suggested manner. Some consideration of such
concerns is now appropriate, but the concerns are not obstacles to
improving the ongoing conflict in the legal field about the law professor
persona(e).

91. Mallin & Anderson, supra note 9, at 130-31.
92. Faass, supra note 28, at 220.
93. FOSS & FOSS, supra note 29, at 13-14.
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One potential concern is that, because invitational rhetoric relies upon
the willingness of the lawyers involved,94 when the lawyers are unwilling to
engage in invitational rhetoric, invitational rhetoric would not be helpful. If
both parties are unable to make attempts to understand each other, then
invitational rhetoric will get them nowhere.
This is a fair point. When two parties do not desire to communicate
productively with each other, invitational rhetoric, by definition, is
impossible.95 Some lawyers, perhaps those deeply entrenched within an
adversarial system, will not want to participate in invitational rhetoric.
However, different lawyers see the world differently, and other lawyers may
choose to participate in invitational rhetoric. The key point here is that
lawyers come in many variations. Some lawyers may find invitational
rhetoric unappealing, but others may see this genre of rhetoric as a welcome
change from the normal discourse of the field.
Additionally, since many lawyers are skillful at speaking, one might ask
whether lawyers really can listen well. After all, good listening is a key part
of invitational rhetoric.96 Despite much of the confrontational
communication in the legal field, some lawyers most likely are effective at
listening, even if they often listen in potentially confrontational situations.
For instance, lawyers have to listen to clients who enter law offices in need
of assistance. A client with extensive assets who wants a will needs a
lawyer who can carefully listen to that client’s needs. Likewise, a client
who needs help defending against a negligence suit that stems from a car
crash wants a lawyer who can listen carefully to the client’s perspective of
what happened, as well as to the perspectives of witnesses to the crash. To
be effective, each lawyer needs information from other individuals. Also,
besides issuing decisions, appellate judges spend time listening to lawyers
who argue appeals. These judges do ask questions, but the other side of the
coin is that the judges also need to listen to the lawyers to gain information.
Indeed, lawyers call upon listening skills in a variety of professional
contexts.
As noted above, such listening skills often take place in a potentially
adversarial context. However, lawyers could transfer such skills to a
nonadversarial context like one open to invitational rhetoric and develop the
skills in that context. While lawyers would have no need to find fault with
the communication to which they would listen, the need to understand
would remain. Lawyers could place additional emphasis on further
94. Foss & Griffin, supra note 8, at 15
95. Id.
96. Id. at 5.
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understanding. As such, lawyers could build upon some of their preexisting skills, even those for which they are often less well known, to
communicate in an invitational manner.
Finally, since parties to invitational rhetoric are not advocating the
merits of their views, invitational rhetoric is not the most effective type of
rhetoric for decision-making. This is an accurate point. In some cases,
invitational rhetoric can lead to change because one party may be willing to
adopt a view of another party.97 However, because invitational rhetoric
does not focus on advocacy, the next section of this Article will offer a
discussion of cooperative rhetoric, which embraces both understanding and
advocacy.
Nonetheless, since invitational rhetoric can foster the
understanding necessary for improved communication and in turn
successful cooperative rhetoric, the general lack of appropriateness of
invitational rhetoric for explicit decision-making does not negate the value
of invitational rhetoric.
In some cases, invitational rhetoric alone can lead to change, but
invitational rhetoric is most likely not the final step in addressing the
ongoing conflict among lawyers regarding the construction of the law
professor persona(e). Because cooperative rhetoric is a more effective type
of rhetoric for decision-making, cooperative rhetoric now calls for attention.
III. COOPERATIVE RHETORIC
A. Cooperative Rhetoric Defined
If no decision comes from the process of invitational rhetoric, at some
point in time the legal field still would benefit from deciding what kind of
law professor persona(e) the field should retain or adopt. Because of the
limits of traditional rhetoric in terms of fostering understanding and
invitational rhetoric in terms of fostering more structured decision-making,
another genre of rhetoric would be of great value to legal decision-makers.
Cooperative rhetoric combines the best of both traditional and invitational
rhetorics. In short, this approach allows rhetors to come to understand the
perspectives of each other and also gives the various rhetors the chance to
argue the merits of such perspectives to arrive at a decision. In light of the
opportunity that cooperative rhetoric presents, this section of the Article
explains how cooperative rhetoric can be of value to lawyers who have
participated in the ongoing conflict over the rhetorical construction of the
law professor persona(e).

97. FOSS & FOSS, supra note 29, at 13-14.
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Scholars have used a variety of terms to speak of the concept of
cooperative rhetoric. For instance, Josina M. Makau and Debian L. Marty
have employed cooperative argumentation,98 Irwin Mallin and Karrin
Vasby Anderson have used constructive argument,99 and Steven E. Daniels
and Gregg B. Walker have called upon both collaborative learning100 and
collaborative argument.101 Despite contemporary interest in this genre of
rhetoric, Richard Fulkerson showed that the concept is not entirely new
because in the Topics Aristotle referenced the idea of common purpose in
rhetoric.102 For the sake of consistency, this Article will call upon the term
cooperative rhetoric.
Under the paradigm of cooperative rhetoric, rhetors focus on addressing
the problem at hand as opposed to “winning” the argument.103 Cooperative
rhetoric is “a process of reasoned interaction intended to help participants
and audiences make the best assessments or the best decisions in any given
situation.”104 In terms of an analogy, one might envision “a group of
mountain climbers concerned for their mutual safety” and thus interested in
testing “two [or more] ropes in every conceivable way and then select[ing]
for their common use the stronger [or strongest] one.”105 Because parties to
the rhetoric are collaborators, not opponents, in addressing problems,106 the
parties see themselves as mutual resources.107 Through the process of
cooperative rhetoric, a cooperative rhetor “offers her [or his] ideas rather
than imposing them, and builds upon her [or his] interlocutor’s ideas rather
than tearing them down.”108 Naturally, listening is a key part of this
process, too.109 Accordingly, cooperative rhetoric seeks to offer
“constructive and productive modes of communication.”110

98. MAKAU & MARTY, supra note 21, at 88.
99. Mallin & Anderson, supra note 9, at 127.
100. STEVEN E. DANIELS & GREGG B. WALKER, WORKING THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT:
THE COLLABORATIVE LEARNING APPROACH 55 (2001).
101. Gregg B. Walker & Steven E. Daniels, Dialogue and Deliberation in Environmental Conflict:
Enacting Civic Science, in ENVTL. COMM. YB. 135, 141-42 (Susan L. Senecah ed., 2004).
102. Richard Fulkerson, Transcending Our Conception of Argument in Light of Feminist Critiques,
32 ARGUMENTATION & ADVOC. 199, 212 (1996).
103. Mallin & Anderson, supra note 9, at 124.
104. MAKAU & MARTY, supra note 21, at 87.
105. DOUGLAS EHNINGER & WAYNE BROCKRIEDE, DECISION BY DEBATE 15 (1978).
106. Mallin & Anderson, supra note 9, at 127.
107. MAKAU & MARTY, supra note 21, at 88.
108. Mallin & Anderson, supra note 9, at 130.
109. Josina M. Makau, Revisioning the Argumentation Course, 15 WOMEN’S STUDIES IN COMM. 79,
79 (1992); Mallin & Anderson, supra note 9, at 128-29.
110. Mallin & Anderson, supra note 9, at 127.
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Furthermore, cooperative rhetoric places emphasis on the
interdependence of people and ideas.111 The cooperative potential of any
given group of rhetors is a function of “the significant value that parties
place on their relationships with one another, their willingness to trust and
share power, their desire for open and constructive communication, and
their respect for creative approaches to” addressing problems.112 This type
of rhetoric can take place in various communication contexts, including
group situations and interpersonal situations.113
As this description has illustrated, cooperative rhetoric is a combination
of the best manifestations of invitational and traditional rhetorics. Because
cooperative rhetoric allows both or all parties to explain themselves to their
fellow rhetors, it places emphasis on the dialogic focus of invitational
rhetoric.114 Additionally, since cooperative rhetoric then allows parties
respectfully to advocate their positions to determine the most appropriate
option or options for that situation, cooperative rhetoric places emphasis on
the deliberative focus of traditional rhetoric.115 However, contrary to many
situations in which traditional rhetoric occurs, situations in which
cooperative rhetoric succeeds involve a respectful tone and a willingness of
the rhetors to yield to positions more conducive to addressing the problems
at hand. Convictions matter, but so do relationships.116 In comparing
rhetors to lovers, Wayne Brockriede might add that cooperative rhetors
value their co-rhetors enough to sacrifice some personal rhetorical gain for
the good of “a bilateral relationship.”117
This understanding of cooperative rhetoric envisions a dialectic between
dialogue and deliberation. In some cases, dialogue will encourage the
communication more toward learning, and in other situations deliberation
will encourage the communication more toward decision-making.118 As
with most any dialectic, including the dialectic between the constructive
abilities of rhetoric and gender, some contradiction or tension exists
between the two foci here, yet for cooperative rhetoric to work as a whole
rhetorical unit, each focus needs to have a high level of interdependence
with the other.119
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

MAKAU & MARTY, supra note 21, at 88.
DANIELS & WALKER, supra note 100, at 63.
MAKAU & MARTY, supra note 21, at 93-95, 97-100.
Walker & Daniels, supra note 101, at 140-41; Foss & Griffin, supra note 8, at 8.
Walker & Daniels, supra note 101, at 140-41; Foss & Griffin, supra note 8, at 5-6.
MAKAU & MARTY, supra note 21, at 91.
Wayne Brockriede, Arguers As Lovers, 5 PHIL. & RHETORIC 1, 5 (1972).
Walker & Daniels, supra note 101, at 141.
Sharon D. Downey, Rhetoric as Balance: A Dialectical Feminist Perspective, 20 WOMEN’S
STUDIES IN COMM. 137, 143-46 (1997).
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Nonetheless, on a critical note, one might query what would happen
when some parties to a rhetorical situation fail to cooperate. One option is
for a motivated party to set the example for other parties. By way of an
analogy, even if oncoming night drivers refuse to dim their headlights, a
frustrated driver might dim the lights on his or her own vehicle to try to
prevent a major crash.120 One can sacrifice one’s personal need for
vindication and achieve a greater good.121 This is the spirit of cooperative
rhetoric. In addressing how cooperative decision-making could function in
a competitive culture, Lani Guinier, a law professor, stated, “‘I think the
best explanation is to model it.’”122
Even if parties are willing to participate in cooperative rhetoric, at some
point they still may reach an impasse. When the parties arrive at such an
impasse, they may want to ask what sort of evidence might change
someone’s view; this inquiry could involve researching new evidence.123
Sometimes thinking out loud can be another option for dealing with blocks
in the communicative process.124 Because cooperative rhetoric can be an
ongoing process that evolves over time,125 the impasse-bound parties may
want to return to work on their problem with fresh minds at a later date.
Such is an understanding of cooperative rhetoric.
Despite the importance of dialogue to the cooperative process, the
foregoing synthesized literature has not embraced invitational rhetoric
vigorously. Of the major pieces of research on cooperative rhetoric
addressed in this subsection, only the Mallin and Anderson article explicitly
made an attempt to develop cooperative rhetoric in part based on
invitational rhetoric.126 While Mallin and Anderson noted that invitational
rhetoric has value for understanding cooperative rhetoric,127 they included in
their study various theories that inform cooperative rhetoric and did not
focus specifically on invitational rhetoric. In light of the theoretical
discussion of invitational rhetoric above and the potential insights for
cooperative rhetoric that such a discussion can provide, invitational rhetoric
deserves some additional consideration as a theory that can foster a more
developed understanding of the dialogic dimension of cooperative rhetoric.
The external conditions that invitational rhetoric considers can help
illustrate the environment in which cooperative rhetors are supposed to be
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

MAKAU & MARTY, supra note 21, at 90.
Id.
Id. at 105.
Walker & Daniels, supra note 101, at 143.
Id.
DANIELS & WALKER, supra note 100, at 63.
Mallin & Anderson, supra note 9, at 121.
Id.
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able to explain themselves and listen to others, eventually to make informed
decisions. Mallin and Anderson noted this point in passing,128 but this
insight calls for more than brief attention. In their theory of invitational
rhetoric, Foss and Griffin have maintained that safety, value, and freedom
are three important external conditions.129 Foss and Griffin have defined
these conditions in this way: safety as “the creation of a feeling of security
and [absence of] danger for the audience,” value as “the acknowledgment
that audience members have intrinsic or immanent worth,” and freedom as
“the power to choose or decide.”130 To the work of Foss and Griffin, Foss
and colleague Karen A. Foss have added openness as a fourth condition that
helps foster the type of climate desired for invitational rhetoric or
cooperative rhetoric.131 Foss and Foss have defined openness as the process
of “seek[ing] out and consider[ing] as many perspectives as possible.”132
The external condition of openness, which Mallin and Anderson did not
address in light of invitational rhetoric,133 is especially important to
cooperative rhetoric. While a party to cooperative rhetoric needs to feel
safe in the communication situation, of some value to the process, and free
to choose for himself or herself, the party also has to remain open to new
ideas. If a party is closed to new ideas, the result can become traditional
rhetoric, in which the rhetors, unyielding to each other, try to persuade the
audience of the “correctness” of the rhetors’ views. In this scenario, only
the audience remains open to change; the rhetors do not. This process, by
itself, can be quite uninformed for the parties, and thus counterproductive.
No openness means no cooperative rhetoric. However, with openness, the
parties develop the spirit of cooperative rhetoric, which is oriented toward
informed decision-making, not just decision-making in general.134
Openness, then, is an important external condition needed in creating a
climate for cooperative rhetoric.
Overall, an understanding of the conditions of safety, value, freedom,
and openness, which, as Foss and Griffin explained with the interpersonal
and public address examples above, can produce the type of communication
climate that encourages dialogue.135 When individuals feel unsafe,
devalued, and constrained regarding decision-making and are close-minded,
they are unlikely to enter the process of dialogue. Without that dialogue,
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 124.
Foss & Griffin, supra note 8, at 10.
Id. at 10-12.
FOSS & FOSS, supra note 29, at 39.
Id.
Mallin & Anderson, supra note 9, at 124.
MAKAU & MARTY, supra note 21, at 87.
FOSS & FOSS, supra note 29, at 35-39; Foss & Griffin, supra note 8, at 13-15.
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cooperative rhetoric fails.136 Thus, an understanding of these conditions,
especially the condition of openness, can help establish a climate in which
the understanding needed in cooperative rhetoric is likely to take place.
To foster these conditions of safety, value, freedom, and openness that
can lead to invitational rhetoric, Foss and Foss have suggested the process
of re-sourcement, which refers to finding a new source of “energy and
inspiration” for one’s communication.137 Re-sourcement involves
disengaging oneself from an interaction frame of conquest or conversion of
one’s audience and then engaging that audience from a nonconquest and
nonconversion interaction frame.138 In other words, participants in the
communication move away from trying to prove others “wrong” and focus
on opening themselves up to comprehending others’ views. In cooperative
rhetoric, when one is temporarily focused on another party’s understanding
of a matter, one is necessarily less focused on advancing one’s own
understanding and can learn from one’s fellow cooperative rhetor. This
type of understanding can suggest new insight that leads one to change and,
ideally, improve one’s own understanding of the problem at hand. With
more information, decision-making should improve.139 As such, the notion
of re-sourcement from invitational rhetoric enriches an understanding of
cooperative rhetoric.
In addition to offering both the specific external conditions that can
establish a climate for cooperative rhetoric and the concept of resourcement that helps bring about the needed external conditions,
invitational rhetoric also validates the personal experiences of different
individuals,140 not just of traditional experts such as physicians, scientists, or
attorneys. This approach can lead to new insights from unexpected sources.
Foss and Foss have pointed out that one’s personal experience often
functions as one’s personal truth,141 and such experience comes from
individuals of varying types. When foregrounded in a discussion, personal
experience from individuals gives voice to a variety of perspectives and, in
a cooperative rhetoric situation, can enrich decision-making. The more
relevant information the decision-makers have, the more informed the
decisions should be.142

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

MAKAU & MARTY, supra note 21, at 87.
FOSS & FOSS, supra note 29, at 44.
Id. at 44-48.
MAKAU & MARTY, supra note 21, at 87.
Foss & Griffin, supra note 8, at 5-6, 16.
Foss & Foss, supra note 52, at 39-40.
MAKAU & MARTY, supra note 21, at 87.
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While not necessarily of prominent value to the conflict over the law
professor persona(e), in which the immediate parties are all lawyers, and
thus traditional experts, giving voice to nontraditional experts in other lawrelated conflicts can provide for a more informed decision-making process.
For instance, in a legal conflict over logging in a particular forest, hearing
from experts well-versed in the law and environmental science is not
enough because nontraditional experts may live near the area in question.
These nontraditional experts have much to say about environmental policies
that directly will impact the lifestyles of those who live in the area. Not
only is this process one of validating communication for the nontraditional
experts in the situation, but the communication can provide more
information regarding parties’ experiences upon which decision-makers can
make informed decisions. This is another aspect of invitational rhetoric that
can help develop a theory of cooperative rhetoric.
The last few pages of this subsection have identified some aspects of
invitational rhetoric that can provide for a richer understanding of the
dialogic dimension of cooperative rhetoric. A better understanding of the
external factors that give rise to invitational rhetoric provides a deeper
understanding of the how those factors can foster dialogue within a
cooperative rhetoric context. Re-sourcement adds to an understanding of
refocusing on other parties to the communication, necessary for cooperative
rhetoric to flourish. Also, the importance of voices of many backgrounds,
valued in invitational rhetoric, demonstrates that, as relevant, many voices
should speak in a cooperative rhetoric situation so that the decision-makers
can make more knowledgeable decisions. Viewed through an invitational
lens, the dialogic dimension of cooperative rhetoric becomes clearer.
B. Collaborative Law as Precedent for Employing Cooperative
Rhetoric
Because the legal field in the United States, as well as in other common
law jurisdictions, places great value upon precedent, having a precedent for
the implementation of cooperative rhetoric in a law-related conflict like the
conflict over the construction of the law professor persona(e) is helpful.
The notion of collaborative law, upon which this subsection of the Article
elaborates, provides such a precedent to suggest that cooperative rhetoric
can function well within some law-related conflicts.
Collaborative law, a type of alternative dispute resolution,143 is a
relatively new approach to law that has developed since the early 1990s,144
143. Harry L. Tindall & Jennie R. Smith, The Uniform Collaborative Law Act As a Teaching Tool,
38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 685, 690 (2009).
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and this approach focuses on “offering ‘kinder and gentler’ ways of helping
parties resolve their differences.”145 Most often used in family law cases
such as divorce cases,146 the process of collaborative law encourages parties
to opt for nonlitigation alternatives to resolve their disputes.147 In agreeing
not to litigate, parties sit down with each other and their lawyers to work out
the best solution given the circumstances,148 and the parties aim to do so
without court intervention.149 The idea is to work together toward a
settlement of the relevant issues150 and give the parties more control over,
and thus more satisfaction regarding, the outcome of the process.151 Parties
who have contributed more to the process are more likely to comply with
the final product.152 The process of collaborative law is confidential153 and
involves “full and timely disclosure of all relevant information.”154 The
lawyers often act more as counselors than as advocates.155 If litigation
results, the lawyers, by way of a pre-existing agreement with the clients
typically called a collaborative law participation agreement, have to
withdraw from the situation, so the litigation incentive for lawyers is
absent.156 Likewise, each attorney promises to withdraw from the case if the
attorney learns his or her client has undermined the collaborative process.157
In a brief hypothetical example, two collaborative lawyers and their
clients would sit down for a four-way meeting158 that would address
possible approaches to managing a divorce. In advance, the wife and the
husband would have expressed their desires to their respective lawyers.
Also in advance, the lawyers would have reviewed the available documents,
144. William H. Schwab, Collaborative Lawyering: A Closer Look at an Emerging Practice, 4
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 351, 354-55 (2004).
145. Stu Webb, Collaborative Law Introduction, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 315, 315 (2004).
146. Schwab, supra note 144, at 354.
147. Julie Macfarlane, Experiences of Collaborative Law: Preliminary Results from the Collaborative Lawyering Research Project, 2004 J. DISP. RESOL. 179, 180 (2004).
148. John Lande, Possibilities for Collaborative Law: Ethics and Practice of Lawyer Disqualification and Process Control in a New Model of Lawyering, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1315, 1320-21 (2003).
149. Yishai Boyarin, Generating “Win-Win” Results: Negotiating Contracts in the Drafting Process of the Uniform Collaborative Law Act, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495, 500 (2009).
150. Diane Curtis, Collaborative law - solving disputes the friendly way, CAL. B.J. (Jan. 2005),
http://archive.calbar.ca.gov/Archive.aspx?articleId=60136&categoryId=60037&month=1&year=2005.
151. Susan Daicoff, Collaborative Law: A New Tool for the Lawyer’s Toolkit, 20 U. FLA. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 113, 131 (2009).
152. Id. at 132.
153. Boyarin, supra note 149, at 505.
154. Douglas C. Reynolds & Doris F. Tennant, Collaborative Law: An Emerging Practice,
BOSTON B.J., Nov.-Dec. 2001, at 12.
155. Boyarin, supra note 149, at 506.
156. Id. at 495; Schwab, supra note 144, at 358.
157. Reynolds & Tennant, supra note 154, at 12.
158. Gary L. Voegele, Linda K. Wray, & Ronald D. Ousky, Collaborative Law: A Useful Tool for
the Family Law Practitioner to Promote Better Outcomes, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 971, 984 (2007).
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such as deeds, mortgages, car payments, and records of credit card debt, to
determine if their clients’ desires had factual support. If possible, the
attorneys would have tried to establish a collaborative relationship before
the first four-way meeting.159 To the first four-way meeting, which would
help lay an important foundation for the overall process,160 the parties would
bring the supporting documents. At the meetings, the parties would aim to
follow previously agreed upon agendas.161 While each lawyer would know
his or her client’s interests in advance, at the first meeting the lawyers and
the parties would need to clarify each party’s interests. This process calls
for the type of active listening, reflective listening, described in the
discussion of invitational rhetoric above.162 The parties would need to be
open with each other about their interests.163 Specifically, the wife might
want to keep a sports car; the husband might want to make sure he has
custody of the children. Different options for addressing these issues would
receive attention.
In addition to dialogue, some well-mannered advocacy of options would
be necessary to the process. One lawyer could argue that, given her daily
commute, the wife would need an automobile, while the other lawyer might
argue that, based on prior parenting experiences, the father should have
custody of the children. If some type of resolution is possible for certain
issues, those issues would be off the table. If not, those issues may require
additional consideration after the parties and lawyers have had a chance to
take a break and think more carefully about each party’s interests. In this
case, subsequent meetings would be helpful. Either way, the parties and the
lawyers would have to be willing to adjust their contentions throughout the
process. For example, adjustments could include accepting a different
family car that would meet the needs of a commute and having partial
custody of children.
Again, in the process of working toward a resolution of some sort, the
dialectic of understanding and advocacy would play out. Since the process
is problem-solving oriented, rather than adversarial in nature, the parties,
who have opted for collaborative law instead of the expensive and
combative traditional option of litigation, would focus on how they could
both find a reasonable end to their marriage. This process would not be for
individuals who seek the most personally lucrative or vengeful end to a
marriage.
159. Id. at 990.
160. Id. at 991.
161. Id. at 993.
162. Mallin & Anderson, supra note 9, at 129.
163. Voegele, Wray, & Ousky, supra note 158, at 994.
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The practice of collaborative law has received formal recognition,
including in the curricula at some law schools.164 Various law schools now
cover collaborative law in seminars on dispute resolution systems,
professional ethics classes, and advanced classes on domestic relations
law.165 Santa Clara University has offered a class specifically in
collaborative law,166 and Loyola University of New Orleans developed a
year-long interdisciplinary course on collaborative practice that aimed to
bring together graduate students in fields like law, psychology, social work,
and business.167 Courses like the one at Loyola University have both
theoretical and practical dimensions because students study why
collaborative practice can be effective and then apply that understanding to
working on collaborative cases from the perspectives of the students’
various disciplines.168
Beyond the law school context, many legal communities and some
states have recognized collaborative law in one manner or another.
Attorneys practice collaborative law across the United States, as well as in
Canada, Europe, and Australia.169 In the United States, training for
collaborative practice often takes place locally and thus is readily
available.170 On a more formal level, Texas was the first state to adopt a
collaborative law statute.171 North Carolina and California soon followed
the Texas example with their own collaborative law statutes.172 More
recently, states such as Utah, Nevada, Texas, and Hawaii, as well as the
District of Columbia, adopted the Uniform Collaborative Law Act (UCLA),
a model statute designed to bring uniformity to the area of collaborative
law.173

164. Elizabeth K. Strickland, Putting “Counselor” Back in the Lawyer’s Job Description: Why
More States Should Adopt Collaborative Law Statutes, 84 N.C. L. REV. 979, 994 (2006).
165. Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Family Law, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 317, 333 (2004). For
an argument for the expanded use of collaborative law in the law school curriculum, see Jill C. Engle,
Collaborative Law in Legal Education: No Time Like the Present, 2 YB. ARB. & MEDIATION 65 (2010).
166. SCU School of Law Offers Exciting New Course, SANTA CLARA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
(Jan. 12, 2003), http://law.scu.edu/news/pr/scu-school-of-law-offers-exciting-new-course.cfm.
167. Tesler, supra note 165, at 333.
168. Id.
169. David A. Hoffman, A healing approach to the law: Collaborative law doesn’t have to be an
oxymoron, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Oct. 9, 2007), http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/1009/p0
9s01-coop.html; Voegele, Wray, & Ousky, supra note 158, at 975 n.15.
170. Daicoff, supra note 151, at 129.
171. Tesler, supra note 165, at 334. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 6.603, 153.0072 (West 2005)
(repealed 2011); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.001 – 15.116 (West 2012).
172. Diana M. Comes, Meet Me in the Middle: The Time Is Ripe for Tennessee to Adopt the Uniform Collaborative Law Act, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 551, 572, 573 (2011). See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§
50-70 – 50-79 (West 2012); CAL. FAM. CODE § 2013 (West 2012).
173. Collaborative Law Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?
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As an interdisciplinary process, collaborative law involves various
fields like psychology, social work, and business,174 but collaborative law
also involves the field of communication. The description of collaborative
law in the preceding pages suggests that collaborative law as an alternative
legal process relates closely to cooperative rhetoric. Indeed, collaborative
law is an example of how cooperative rhetoric can play out in a given field,
here the legal field. In general, cooperative rhetoric explains how both
understanding and advocacy are key ingredients in collaborative law. In the
manner noted above, participants in collaborative law work to develop
understanding of the interests of fellow participants and also employ
advocacy to test ideas and move toward resolutions.
More specifically, in terms of the dialogic dimension of collaborative
law, cooperative rhetoric, as invitational rhetoric informs it, has much to
offer. Indeed, cooperative rhetoric addresses the external conditions of
safety, value, freedom, and openness necessary for collaborative law to
occur successfully. For instance, parties to collaborative law need to feel
safe enough that they are willing to disclose documents and other
information that normally would remain closely held before, and sometimes
even during, the cat-and-mouse process of civil discovery. Conflicts
notwithstanding, the parties also have to be able to see some human value in
each other because, without recognizing that each party has importance, the
parties can allow their frustrations and grudges to take over. Under these
conditions, collaborative law would revert back to a more hostile and clashoriented process that would not be collaborative in nature.
Another external condition, freedom, also explains the climate
necessary for collaborative law. When parties to collaborative law try to
force resolutions on each other, the process becomes more akin to some
types of traditional civil litigation, in which parties, through their attorneys,
try to force each other into a corner. For example, in civil litigation an
attorney might claim that her opponent’s case would be without value at
trial and that the opponent should counsel his client to take a minor
settlement at once or risk getting nothing. Instead of cornering each other,
parties in a collaborative process should recognize that both parties have the
freedom to make personal choices, given the constraints of the situation. A
collaborative process involves at least two parties empowered to make
decisions.
title=Collaborative%20Law%20Act (last visited Oct. 10, 2012). See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-19-101 –
78B-19-116 (West 2012); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 38.400 – 38.575 (West 2012) (effective Jan. 1, 2013);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§15.001 – 15.116 (West 2012); Hawaii Uniform Collaborative Law Act, No.
207 (July 3, 2012); and D.C. CODE §§ 16-4001 – 16-4022 (West 2012).
174. Tesler, supra note 165, at 330-33.
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The final external condition relevant to a productive climate for
collaborative law is openness. When parties are open to new suggestions,
the process can move forward. If a party rigidly insists that, due to
transportation needs, the party must get a specific vehicle after a divorce,
the process may go nowhere. However, if the first party is open to receiving
a cash payment from the second party that will address the transportation
needs, the process can move forward in a productive manner.
Just as the external conditions needed for cooperative rhetoric help
explain the conditions needed for collaborative law, so does the concept of
re-sourcement. Parties who wish to avoid the hostile confrontation common
in traditional divorce or child custody proceedings need to be able to move
their goals away from conquest and focus initially on understanding.
Conquest does not address the potentially unknown needs of other parties,
nor does it give one a chance to explain one’s own needs. When parties
find a new source of focus for the communication process they can move
away from traditional litigation models and toward less destructive models.
Additionally, the importance of giving voice to nontraditional experts
that is a part of the dialogic dimension of cooperative rhetoric is instructive
in explaining collaborative law. In a traditional child custody case, the
voices of the children easily might receive inadequate attention because the
lawyers are zealously representing the parties and the parents are full of hate
for each other. However, in a collaborative law situation, in which the
parties have agreed to try to work out a nonlitigation resolution to the
situation, the parties will arrive at a more informed decision if they give
voice to all individuals with a stake in the outcome. Such individuals would
include children.175 Just as the parents need a say, so do the other
individuals whose futures are at stake in the decision-making process of
collaborative law. Despite these insights that cooperative rhetoric offers the
communication aspect, particularly the dialogic dimension of the
communication aspect, of collaborative law, lawyers have much to learn
about how communication theory can inform collaborative law. A
LexisNexis search of fifty-eight law review articles and other articles with
the term collaborative law in the titles revealed that, while forty-five articles
at least contained the term communication, only one article contained the
term communication theory, which was in a footnote that appropriately

175. Joan B. Kelly, Psychological and Legal Interventions for Parents and Children in Custody
and Access Disputes: Current Research and Practice, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 129, 150-51 (2002);
Robert E. Emery, Easing the Pain of Divorce for Children: Children’s Voices, Causes of Conflict, and
Mediation -- Comments on Kelly’s “Resolving Child Custody Disputes,” 10 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 164,
170 (2002).
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pointed to the lack of communication theory in legal education.176 No
articles contained the term rhetorical theory or the term cooperative
rhetoric. Because fields other than psychology, business, and social work
can contribute to a richer understanding of the process of collaborative law,
lawyers would benefit from considering what communication theories like
cooperative rhetoric have to say about collaborative law.
C. Applying Cooperative Rhetoric to the Conflict over the Construction
of the Law Professor Persona(e)
In light of collaborative law as a precedent for the implementation of
cooperative rhetoric in certain law-related conflicts, lawyers involved in the
ongoing conflict over the rhetorical construction of the law professor
persona(e) ultimately would stand to gain from employing cooperative
rhetoric. To date, lawyers have filled volumes deliberating over law
professor personae, but, because of the existing problem with
understanding, lawyers initially would benefit from gaining a more
complete comprehension of differing perspectives on law professor
personae by focusing on dialogue for a period of time. In short, at this point
traditional rhetoric has had its time, and invitational rhetoric still awaits its
time. Given its focus on understanding, invitational rhetoric is a medicinal
genre of rhetoric appropriate for the immediate future. However, at some
point in the future, when willing lawyers have listened for understanding
through invitational rhetoric and if invitational rhetoric alone has not
provided for sufficient decision-making, a need for some deliberation and
decision-making still would remain. At that future moment, cooperative
rhetoric, which collaborative law precedents, would come into play.
As the preceding discussion of invitational rhetoric suggested, an
important incentive for parties to participate in this cooperative process is
common ground regarding the goals for legal education. Indeed, some of
the major goals of legal education, including producing legal scholarship,
addressing the roles of practicing lawyers, developing the skills of legal
problem-solving, and discussing what law is and should be,177 speak to the
needs of both academic lawyers and practicing lawyers. By way of his or
her professional status, the law professor has an important influence on the
furtherance of these goals. Accordingly, academic lawyers and practicing
lawyers have an incentive to try to communicate more productively about
the role(s) of the law professor in legal education.
176. Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Law: A New Paradigm for Divorce Lawyers, 5 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 967, 971 n.14 (1999).
177. KELSO & KELSO, supra note 56, at 12-15.
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Given this incentive for lawyers to participate in a cooperative process,
a communication consultant would explain an overview of that process to
the participating lawyers in this manner. As noted above, lawyers often
meet during law school campus lectures, bar association functions, and the
day-to-day work of public service functions of the bar.178 With the general
presence of safety, value, freedom, and openness, these situations offer the
chance for invitational rhetoric to take place. Because of the constructive
nature of these situations, the situations also offer the chance for
cooperative rhetoric to transpire. In such a cooperative situation, lawyers
would be able to focus on dialogue as well as respectful advocacy. This
type of advocacy, informed through dialogue, could spill over from these
situations into written fora like law journals and legal magazines, which
then would spread the argumentation to a nationwide legal audience. A
special symposium, later published in a law journal, would be another
option.
The communication consultant would note that, through this procedure,
willing lawyers would focus on effective approaches to the persona(e) most
appropriate for current legal education, rather than on personal egos and
reputations. Given the long-standing Aristotelian assumptions of the legal
system in the United States, spirited argumentation most likely would result
at some point, but lawyers would do well to view their colleagues as
resources rather than opponents.179 Rather than promoting hostile advocacy,
the goal would be promoting an effective approach or effective approaches
to legal education, specifically with regard to the law professor role(s).
Lawyers and their ideas would interact, but in a constructive manner.
More specifically, the process between the two hypothetical lawyers
noted above could look something like this. The communication consultant
would explain that, one at a time, the lawyers would outline the particulars
of how they saw the role(s) of the law professor in legal education. While
one lawyer spoke, the other lawyer would try to put aside his or her views
and instead focus on understanding the other lawyer, which might include
asking some questions, and then the roles would reverse. The active
listening needed for this process is the reflective listening that Mallin and
Anderson described.180 This part of the process would be akin to the part of
a collaborative law process in which parties to a child custody matter offer
their understandings, needs, and suggested approaches to addressing the
situation, except in the former situation the lawyers would not have their
178. Leflar, supra note 60, at 22, 24.
179. MAKAU & MARTY, supra note 21, at 88; Mallin & Anderson, supra note 9, at 127.
180. Mallin & Anderson, supra note 9, at 129.
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own counsel as the parties in the child custody matter would. Much like the
parties to a collaborative law process, the parties to cooperative rhetoric
would assume an approach that seeks to avoid the type of destructive
rhetoric often found in litigation. Re-sourcement would be helpful here,
too. At the end of this dialogic part in the process, the lawyers ideally
should be able to explain accurately and in some detail the views they have
come to understand via this portion of the process.
Subsequently, either on the same occasion or on another one, the
lawyers would proceed to argue over the merits of the perspectives on the
table. As the consultant would note, this process would involve attempts to
further the merits of the models placed on the table, but, in contrast to the
process of argumentation that has been underway in the ongoing
communication regarding the law professor persona(e), the cooperative
process would involve two parties who have agreed to remain open to
change in order to make an effective decision. For instance, the first lawyer
might realize that the second lawyer has made a good point about the need
for law schools to graduate practice-ready students, and the first lawyer may
want to modify, but not abandon, her own model. Likewise, the second
lawyer might realize that, given that the current law school exists within the
university system, the first lawyer has made a strong point that scholarship
is important to the law professor persona and accordingly modify, but not
abandon, his model. This part of the process would be akin to the part of a
collaborative law process in which the lawyers and parties evaluate
differing possible approaches to the situation. Just as in collaborative law,
the parties in the conflict over the law professor persona(e) would need to
keep in mind the commitment to work on the problem and avoid threatening
to take a more verbally hostile approach to the situation. In the case studied
here, the cooperative lawyers could go back and forth working out which
points had some merit and which were baseless.
Although one party could completely abandon a model in favor of
another model, in light of the longstanding and entrenched views in the
conflict over the law professor persona(e), this would be unlikely.
However, as the two lawyers make strong points about the relative merits of
their preferred models, the parties, now more informed about the models on
the table, might be willing to accept some changes based on the reasoning
process. Much the same as in a collaborative law situation, but with
different content, such a reasoning process that involves some give and take
could help foster a workable model of the law professor that speaks to the
various needs, practical and scholarly, of the two major groups in this
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conflict. Eventually, at some point in the future and as a function of having
participated in cooperative rhetoric, lawyers would retain, alter, or even
abandon the current law professor persona, that of the scholar.181 Quite
predictably, not all lawyers would be willing to participate in cooperative
rhetoric, but some probably would be. Some of the lawyers who practice
collaborative law, who now can be found across the United States,182 would
be good ambassadors for cooperative rhetoric as a means of improving
communication regarding the ongoing conflict over the law professor
persona(e), as well communication regarding other important issues in the
legal world. Such lawyers could set the example and perhaps encourage
more skeptical lawyers to try cooperative rhetoric on this issue or others of
importance.
In picking up on differing concerns, lawyers might decide cooperatively
to devise any of several possible law professor persona(e). For instance,
lawyers might opt for a model in which the law professor would continue to
practice while teaching and thus be able to test legal hypotheses,183 or
lawyers could opt for a model in which a lawyer with great practical
experience would become a full-time professor.184 Alternatively, lawyers
could find that the two different major law professor personae, the scholar
and the practitioner, together meet the expectations of the university and the
bar. Since one persona would be appropriate for producing scholarship and
the other persona would be appropriate for developing hands-on skills in
law students, the personae together would be available to meet the different
demands placed on law schools.
Various decisions regarding the law professor persona(e) could result
from this cooperative approach to rhetoric. Because a cooperative approach
does not prescribe substantive decisions but rather suggests a process for
communication and leaves content up to the parties to the communication,
these potential results are merely illustrations of what content that might
develop, not necessarily what has to develop. The purpose of the
illustrations is to make the cooperative process more concrete at this point.
Again, these are only some conceivable results that could stem from
cooperative rhetoric, but they begin to illustrate how this type of process
might generate results.
Supported by collaborative lawyers and other open-minded lawyers,
cooperative rhetoric would come with several benefits. For instance, some
181. For recognition that the current law professor persona is that of the scholar, see Pedrioli, supra
note 1, at 725.
182. Hoffman, supra note 169.
183. Kales, supra note 79, at 259-60.
184. Stone, supra note 83, at 210-11.
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lawyers would develop a greater appreciation for listening and
understanding, which can be helpful in dealing with people in many
contexts. At the same time, lawyers would be able to call upon their
existing skills of persuasion, ideally in a way that focuses more on the
messages than on the messengers. Additionally, as a function of the
communication, a well-thought-out decision regarding the ideal role(s) of
the law professor would be a real possibility, and lawyers would not simply
be talking past each other as they have been for ages. This prospect is the
key benefit that this research offers in addressing the conflict over the
rhetorical construction of the law professor persona(e). Finally, as the
practice of collaborative law suggests, this cooperative approach to rhetoric
would be one that lawyers could rely upon in other situations in their
professional lives, including negotiation situations.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has explained how alternative rhetorics can offer new
possibilities for helping to improve the ongoing conflict over the rhetorical
persona(e) of the U.S. law professor. To do so, the Article addressed
invitational rhetoric at the levels of theory and application. Moving forward
but still drawing upon invitational rhetoric, the Article addressed
cooperative rhetoric at a level of theory, as having precedent in
collaborative law, and at a level of application in the specific conflict.
The many lawyers whose rhetoric received consideration in the
precursor to this Article185 have illustrated how communication is not a
perfect idea.
As John Durham Peters envisioned the concept,
communication is “the project of reconciling self and other.”186
Communication usually involves two or more parties, the self and other(s),
who often have differing views of the world. Because life is complex,
thinking that better communicating will resolve communication problems is
problematic.187 Indeed, a standard of perfection is too high because humans
“can never communicate like the angels.”188
Nonetheless, human communicators do not have to be “lonely zombies
searching for soul mates,”189 nor do they have to be over-zealous advocates
who refuse to listen to each other. The prospect of imperfect

185. See generally Pedrioli, supra note 1.
186. JOHN DURHAM PETERS, SPEAKING INTO THE AIR: A HISTORY OF THE IDEA OF
COMMUNICATION 9 (1999).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 29.
189. Id.
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communication, which often involves relying on “faith and risk,”190 is still a
possibility. Alternative approaches to communication like cooperative
rhetoric are examples of this. Part of cooperative rhetoric is invitational
rhetoric, through which rhetors take the risk that co-rhetors may decline
invitations. However, another possibility of invitational rhetoric is that
rhetors take the chance that co-rhetors may accept invitations and new
relationships may develop. Viewpoints may be different and even hard to
understand, yet the opportunity for positive communication remains. This
possibility is an important promise of invitational rhetoric. Placed in
conversation with a respectful version of the more traditional Aristotelian
understanding of rhetoric, invitational rhetoric can function within a
dynamic dialectic that becomes cooperative rhetoric. Individuals can take
the chance that cooperative rhetoric will open new doors to imperfect, but
positive, communication. At a minimum, the persona(e) of the law
professor and the legal field may be healthier for the risk.

190. Id. at 30.

